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Open Peer Commentaries
That Little Matter of Consciousness
Martha Farah, University of Pennsylvania
Brain imaging holds great promise for improving our un-5
derstanding of disorders of consciousness and for guiding
diagnosis and treatment of these disorders. It is also a new
approach and the published literature is still small and not
entirely consistent. Fins and colleagues (2008) have therefore
undertaken the important and timely project of formulating10
recommendations for future research. They make a number
of valuable points, but strangely they omit any mention of
the issues that make this research so uniquely challenging
and important—issues related to consciousness.
Neuroimaging of severely brain-damaged patients is15
important because, in the authors’ words, it has “provided
clues of otherwise elusive conscious processes in the injured
human brain.” Yet in analyzing the literature and formulat-
ing their recommendations, they write that that “the major
challenges are patient selection and study design, and stan-20
dardization of the technology, including stimulus selection
and experimental protocols.” The aspects of study designQ1
to which they refer concern correlations with established
diagnostic criteria to address issues of nosology and diag-
nosis and longitudinal designs to address issues of progno-25
sis. What has been overlooked are the issues of conceptual
analysis and study design that make imaging consciousness
different from imaging other brain phenomena such as de-
myelination, plaques, or blood flow. Analyzing the literature
on brain imaging of consciousness in terms of sample size30
and scanning parameters is a little like analyzing a steamy
love scene in a movie in terms of lighting and camera work.
Granted, these are important to get right, but they’re not
what we’re most interested in!
Consciousness is at the heart of the distinction between35
the vegetative state (VS) and minimally conscious state
(MCS). It is also essential for determining our ethical obliga-
tions to a patient; for example, determining whether custo-
dial care is enough and whether we should supply pain relief
for painful conditions or procedures. Yet unlike most neuro-40
logical signs and symptoms, the presence of consciousness
in a noncommunicative patient cannot be measured, ob-
served, or ascertained by examination. We are left with a par-
ticularly intractable form of the classic philosophical “prob-
lem of other minds”; in other words, the problem of inferring45
the mental experience of another being from the observable
behavior of that being. Whereas only the philosophical skep-
tic would doubt that a talking, behaving human has con-
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scious experiences, in the case of severely brain-damaged
patients it is often difficult to know. Patients who appear to
be in a VS may instead be in MCS or even “locked-in”; that 50
is, fully conscious yet unable to communicate (Bauer et al.
1979). How might the imaging of brain activity provide in-
formation about patients’ mental processes when their be-
havior does not? According to virtually all conceptions of
mind–brain relations in contemporary philosophy of mind 55
(identity theories, varieties of functionalism, supervenience
theories), one cannot be in the brain state corresponding to
a mental state without also being in that mental state. Thus,
brain imaging gives us a perspective on thought processes,
including conscious thought processes, that is direct in a 60
way that behavior is not (Farah, 2008).
Of course, in order for brain imaging to live up to its po-
tential as a tool for studying consciousness in severely brain-
damaged patients, some conceptual and empirical ground-
work is needed. So here I offer additional recommendations 65
for future neuroimaging research on disorders of conscious-
ness, to supplement those already offered in the Target Ar-
ticle. These recommendations focus on the ways in which
consciousness is operationalized in imaging studies, the im-
plicit assumptions involved in operationalizing conscious- 70
ness in these ways, and implications for future research.
Functional brain imaging has been used in three quali-
tatively different ways to infer the mental status of severely
brain-damaged patients. The logic of the experimental de-
signs, and their consequent strengths and weaknesses, differ 75
across the three cases. The first recommendation is therefore
to bear these differences in mind and avoid treating them
as equivalent when interpreting the results of studies and
attempting to integrate the results of multiple studies.
Examples of all three approaches can be found in 80
Table 1 of the Target Article. One approach is to show pre- Q2
served high-level cognitive processing by patients’ brains, of
the kind normally accompanied by consciousness. This ap-
proach is exemplified by the study of Schiff et al. (2005). Pa-
tients in MCS were scanned while recordings of either mean- 85
ingful speech or backwards speech were played to them. The
difference in brain activation in response to forward and
backward speech was used as a measure of their brains’
processing of meaningful speech per se; that is, without
auditory processing that is common to both meaningful and 90
meaningless speech sounds. Surprisingly, the MCS patients
ajob 1
UAJB˙A˙341415 AJB.cls September 5, 2008 20:33
The American Journal of Bioethics
showed patterns of brain activity that were qualitatively
similar to those evoked in normal healthy subjects, suggest-
ing that large-scale networks underlying language compre-
hension were to some degree preserved in these severely
brain-damaged individuals. Although the authors of the95
study were careful to interpret these results as indicating
preserved language function but not necessarily conscious-
ness, the results have been described elsewhere as indicative
of consciousness (Carey, 2005) and the finding is discussed
in most reviews of consciousness in VS and MCS. The im-100
plicit assumption here is that higher cognitive processes,
such as those involved in speech recognition, cannot be car-
ried out unconsciously, and so evidence of these cognitive
processes is evidence of consciousness. This assumption is
supported by everyday experience, but it is not true under105
all circumstances. As pointed out by Levy (2008), the cogni-
tive psychology literature contains many examples of dis-
sociated cognition and awareness. More to the point, brain
damage can lead to just this type of dissociation (Farah et al.
1993). In short, cognition is not the same as consciousness. To110
demonstrate consciousness, other approaches are needed.
A second approach to detecting consciousness in
severely brain-damaged patients makes use of previous cog-
nitive neuroscience research on the neural correlates of con-
sciousness. It involves showing preservation of patterns of115
activity that have been demonstrated, in previous research,
to distinguish conscious from unconscious processing. This
approach is exemplified by Boly and colleagues (2004) listed
in Table 1 of the target article. In this study, investigatorsQ3
used simple clicks as probes to activate the brain and looked120
to see what parts of the brain became active and whether the
activity in these different parts was intercorrelated. The im-
plicit assumption here is that consciousness arises with cer-
tain patterns of brain activity — perhaps activity in certain
regions, such as medial frontal and parietal areas, or activ-125
ity that is correlated across certain brain areas. Such an as-
sociation between patterns of activation and consciousness
would have to be demonstrated initially by experimental
manipulations of consciousness in normal brains and then
used as a signature of consciousness in the damaged brain.130
Boly et al. sought patterns of activation like those demon-
strated in other studies to mark conscious auditory percep-
tion and found them in MCS but not VS patients. A weak-
ness of this approach comes from the paucity of brain imag-
ing studies in which conscious and unconscious processing135
have been directly compared. To advance research using
this approach, we need more such studies, using different
subject populations and different methods of manipulating
conscious awareness of stimuli, to provide a more general
and reliable “brain signature” of consciousness.140
The third and final approach that has so far been taken
is to use brain activity as a surrogate for overt behavior
in examining patients for consciousness. This was used by
Owen and colleagues (2006) to demonstrate command fol-
lowing in a patient who met criteria for VS. The commands145
in this case were to imagine playing tennis or taking a walk
through the rooms of one’s home, and the patient’s compli-
ance with these commands was demonstrated by patterns
of brain activity characteristic of imagined motor activity
and imagined navigation. The implicit assumption for this 150
approach is that such commands cannot be followed with-
out conscious awareness. If it were the case that hearing
the request to imagine playing tennis could automatically
and unconsciously trigger motor imagery, then Owen et al.’s
findings would not be evidence of consciousness. However, 155
this seems implausible. After all, when a patient squeezes
the examiner’s hand on request, we take that as evidence
of consciousness and do not ask whether the squeeze could
have been triggered unconsciously. Nevertheless, this ap-
proach could be strengthened by devising commands that 160
result in recognizable patterns of brain activity but are even
less plausibly attributed to automatic and unconscious as-
sociations with specific words or phrases.
In sum, three research strategies that have been used
so far to detect consciousness in severely brain-damaged 165
patients. One is based on an incorrect assumption about
the relation between consciousness and cognition, and these
studies should not be used for evidence concerning patients’
conscious awareness. In contrast, the other two strategies
hold promise. Their potential can be more fully realized by 170
further research on the neural correlates of consciousness
in the healthy brain and the development of new protocols
using brain activity as a surrogate for behavioral responses.

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